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Matching under Preferences
Bettina Klausa, David F. Manloveb and Francesca Rossic
14.1 Introduction and discussion of applications
Matching theory studies how agents and/or objects from different sets can be
matched with each other while taking agents’ preferences into account. The theory
originated in 1962 with a celebrated paper by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962),
in which they proposed the Stable Marriage Algorithm as a solution to the prob-
lem of two-sided matching. Since then, this theory has been successfully applied
to many real-world problems such as matching students to universities, doctors to
hospitals, kidney transplant patients to donors, and tenants to houses. This chapter
will focus on algorithmic as well as strategic issues of matching theory.
Many large-scale centralised allocation processes can be modelled by matching
problems where agents have preferences over one another. For example, in China,
over 10 million students apply for admission to higher education annually through
a centralised process. The inputs to the matching scheme include the students’
preferences over universities and vice versa, and the capacities of each university.1
The task is to construct a matching that is in some sense optimal with respect to
these inputs.
Economists have long understood the problems with decentralised matching mar-
kets, which can suffer from such undesirable properties as unravelling, congestion
and exploding offers (see Roth and Xing, 1994, for details). For centralised markets,
constructing allocations by hand for large problem instances is clearly infeasible.
Thus centralised mechanisms are required for automating the allocation process.
Given the large number of agents typically involved, the computational efficiency
of a mechanism’s underlying algorithm is of paramount importance. Thus we seek
polynomial-time algorithms for the underlying matching problems. Equally impor-
tant are considerations of strategy: an agent (or a coalition of agents) may ma-
nipulate their input to the matching scheme (e.g., by misrepresenting their true
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1 In fact, students are first assigned to universities and then to their programme of study within the
university; see, e.g., Zhu, 2014.
2 B. Klaus, D.F. Manlove and F. Rossi
preferences, or under-reporting their capacity) in order to try to improve their out-
come. A desirable property of a mechanism is strategy-proofness, which ensures that
it is in the best interests of an agent to behave truthfully.
The study of matching problems involving preferences was begun in 1962 with the
seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962) who gave an efficient algorithm for the
so-called Stable Marriage problem (which involves matching men to women based
on each person having preferences over members of the opposite sex) and showed
how to extend it to the College Admissions problem, a many-to-one extension of
the Stable Marriage problem which involves allocating students to colleges based
on college capacities, and also on students’ preferences over colleges and vice versa.
Their algorithm has come to be known as the Gale–Shapley algorithm.
Since 1962, the study of matching problems involving preferences has grown
into a large and active research area, and numerous contributions have been made
by computer scientists, economists, and mathematicians, among others. Several
monographs exclusively dealing with this class of problems have been published
(Knuth, 1976; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Manlove,
2013).
A particularly appealing aspect of this research area is the range of practical
applications of matching problems, leading to real-life scenarios where efficient al-
gorithms can be deployed and issues of strategy can be overcome. One of the best-
known examples is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the US,
which handles the annual allocation of intending junior doctors (or residents) to
hospital posts. In 2014, 40,394 aspiring junior doctors applied via the NRMP for
29,671 available residency positions (NRMP website, 2014). The problem model is
very similar to Gale and Shapley’s College Admissions problem, and indeed an ex-
tension of the Gale–Shapley algorithm is used to construct the allocation each year
(Roth, 1984a; Roth and Peranson, 1997). Similar medical matching schemes exist
in Canada, Japan and the UK. As Roth argued, the key property for a matching
to satisfy in this context is stability, which ensures that a resident and hospital do
not have the incentive to deviate from their allocation and become matched to one
another.
Similar applications arise in the context of School Choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez, 2003). For example in Boston and New York, centralised matching schemes
are employed to assign pupils to schools on the basis of the preferences of pupils (or
more realistically their parents) over schools, and pupils’ priorities for assignment
to a given school (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a,b). A school’s priority for a pupil
might include issues such as geographical proximity and whether the pupil has a
sibling at the school already, among others.
Kidney exchange (Roth et al., 2004, 2005) is another application of matching
that has grown in importance in recent years. Sometimes, a kidney patient with a
willing but incompatible donor can swap their donor with that of another patient
in a similar position. Efficient algorithms are required to organise kidney “swaps”
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on the basis of information about donor and patient compatibilities. Such swaps
can involve two or more patient–donor pairs, but usually the maximum number of
pairs involved is three. Also altruistic donors can trigger “chains” involving swaps
between patient–donor pairs. These allow for a larger number of kidney transplants
(compared to those one could perform based on deceased donors only) and thus
more lives saved. Centralised clearinghouses for kidney exchange are in operation
on a nationwide scale in a number of countries including the US (Roth et al., 2004,
2005; Ashlagi and Roth, 2012), The Netherlands (Keizer et al., 2005) and the UK
(Johnson et al., 2008). The problem of maximising the number of kidney transplants
performed through cycles and chains is NP-hard (Abraham et al., 2007a), though
algorithms based on Mixed Integer Programming have been developed and are used
to solve this problem at scale in the countries mentioned (Abraham et al., 2007a;
Dickerson et al., 2013; Manlove and O’Malley, 2012; Glorie et al., 2014).
The importance of the research area in both theoretical and practical senses was
underlined in 2012 by the award of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sci-
ences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (commonly known as the Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences) to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley for their work in “the theory of stable
allocations and the practice of market design”. This reflects both Shapley’s con-
tribution to the Stable Marriage algorithm among other theoretical advances, and
Roth’s application of these results to matching markets involving the assignment
of junior doctors to hospitals, pupils to schools, and kidney patients to donors. The
Nobel prize rules state that the prize cannot be awarded posthumously and hence
David Gale (1921-2008) could not be honoured for his important contributions.
Matching problems involving preferences can be classified as being either bipartite
or non-bipartite. In the former case, the agents are partitioned into two disjoint sets
A and B, and the members of A have preferences over only the members of B (and
possibly vice versa). In the latter case we have one single set of agents, each of
whom ranks some or all of the others in order of preference. For space reasons we
will consider only bipartite matching problems involving preferences in this chapter.
Bipartite problems can be further categorised according to whether the prefer-
ences are two-sided or one-sided. In the former case, members of both of the sets A
and B have preferences over one another, whilst in the latter case only the mem-
bers of A have preferences (over the members of B). Bipartite matching problems
with two-sided preferences arise in the context of assigning junior doctors to hos-
pitals, for example, whilst one-sided preferences arise in applications including the
assignment of students to campus housing and reviewers to conference papers.
Our treatment covers ordinal preferences (where preferences are expressed in
terms of first choice, second choice, etc.) rather than cardinal utilities (where pref-
erences are expressed in terms of real-numbered valuations). In their simplest form,
models of kidney exchange problems can involve dichotomous preferences (a special
case of ordinal preferences, where an agent either finds another agent acceptable or
not, and is indifferent among those it does find acceptable), on the basis of whether
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a patient is compatible with a potential donor or not. However in practice models of
kidney exchange are more complex, typically involving cardinal utilities rather than
ordinal preferences, and therefore the matching problems defined in this chapter do
not encompass theoretical models of kidney exchange.
The problems considered in this chapter sit strongly within the field of compu-
tational social choice. This field lies at the interface of economics and computer
science, and our approach will involve interleaving key aspects that have hitherto
been considered by the two communities in bodies of literature that have largely
pertained to the two disciplines separately. Such key considerations involve the ex-
istence of structural results and efficient algorithms, and the derivation of strategy-
proof mechanisms. These topics will be reviewed in each of the cases of bipartite
matching problems with two-sided and one-sided preferences. Although space re-
strictions have necessarily limited our coverage, we have tried to include the results
that we feel will be of most importance to the readership of this handbook.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 14.2, we focus on bipartite
matching problems where both sides have preferences. Here the most important
property for a matching to satisfy is stability. In Section 14.2.1 we define the key
matching problems in this class, most notably the Hospitals / Residents problem,
and we also define stability in this context. We then state fundamental structural
and algorithmic results concerning the existence, computation, and structural prop-
erties of stable matchings, in Section 14.2.2. Issues of strategy, and in particular
the existence (or otherwise) of strategy-proof mechanisms, are dealt with in Section
14.2.3. Next, in Section 14.2.4, we outline some further algorithmic results, including
decentralised algorithms for computing stable matchings, variants of the Hospitals
/ Residents problem involving ties and couples, and many-to-many extensions.
Bipartite matching problems where only one side of the market has preferences
are considered in Section 14.3. The fundamental problems in this class are the
House Allocation problem and its extension to Housing Markets. We define these
problems together with key properties of matchings, including Pareto optimality
and membership of the core, in Section 14.3.1. Section 14.3.2 describes some im-
portant mechanisms that can be used to produce Pareto optimal matchings and
matchings in the core. Strategy-proofness is considered in Section 14.3.3, and then
further algorithmic results are described in Section 14.3.4, including the computa-
tion of maximum Pareto optimal, popular, and profile-based optimal matchings.
Finally, in Section 14.4 we give some concluding remarks and list some further
sources of reading.
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14.2 Two-sided preferences
14.2.1 Introduction and preliminary definitions
The Hospitals / Residents problem2 (hr) (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irv-
ing, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Manlove, 2008) was first defined by Gale and
Shapley in their seminal paper “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”
(Gale and Shapley, 1962).
An instance I of hr involves a set R = {r1, . . . , rn1} of residents and a set H =
{h1, . . . , hn2} of hospitals. Each hospital hj ∈ H has a positive integral capacity,
denoted by cj , indicating the number of posts that hj has. Also there is a set
E ⊆ R×H of acceptable resident–hospital pairs. Let m = |E|. Each resident ri ∈ R
has an acceptable set of hospitals A(ri), where A(ri) = {hj ∈ H : (ri, hj) ∈ E}.
Similarly each hospital hj ∈ H has an acceptable set of residents A(hj), where
A(hj) = {ri ∈ R : (ri, hj) ∈ E}.
The agents in I are the residents and hospitals in R ∪ H. Each agent ak ∈
R ∪H has a preference list in which she/it ranks A(ak) in strict order. Given any
resident ri ∈ R, and given any hospitals hj , hk ∈ H, ri is said to prefer hj to hk if
{hj , hk} ⊆ A(ri) and hj precedes hk on ri’s preference list; the prefers relation is
defined similarly for a hospital.
An assignment M in I is a subset of E. If (ri, hj) ∈M , ri is said to be assigned
to hj , and hj is assigned ri. For each ak ∈ R ∪ H, the set of assignees of ak in
M is denoted by M(ak). If ri ∈ R and M(ri) = ∅, ri is said to be unassigned,
otherwise ri is assigned. Similarly, a hospital hj ∈ H is undersubscribed or full
according as |M(hj)| is less than or equal to cj , respectively. A matching M in I
is an assignment such that |M(ri)| ≤ 1 for each ri ∈ R and |M(hj)| ≤ cj for each
hj ∈ H. For notational convenience, given a matching M and a resident ri ∈ R
such that M(ri) 6= ∅, where there is no ambiguity the notation M(ri) is also used
to refer to the single member of the set M(ri).
Given an instance I of hr and a matching M , a pair (ri, hj) ∈ E\M blocks M
(or is a blocking pair for M) if (i) ri is unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri) and (ii)
hj is undersubscribed or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj). M is said to
be stable if it admits no blocking pair. If a resident–hospital pair (ri, hj) belongs to
some stable matching in I, ri is called a stable partner of hj and vice versa.
Example 14.1 (hr instance) Consider the following hr instance:
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : 1 : r3 r2 r1 r4
r2 : h1 h2 h3 h2 : 2 : r2 r3 r1 r4
r3 : h2 h1 h3 h3 : 1 : r2 r3
r4 : h2 h1
Here, r1 prefers h1 to h2 and does not find h3 acceptable. Also, h1 has capacity 1
2 The Hospitals / Residents problem is sometimes referred to as the College (or University or Stable)
Admissions problem, or the Stable Assignment problem.
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and prefers r3 to r2, etc. M = {(r2, h1), (r3, h2), (r4, h2)} is a matching in which
each resident is assigned apart from r1, and each of h1 and h2 is full while h3 is
undersubscribed. M is not stable because (r1, h2) is a blocking pair.
The Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (smi) (Gale and Shapley, 1962;
Knuth, 1976; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Irving, 2008)
is an important special case of hr in which cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H, and residents
and hospitals are more commonly referred to as men and women respectively. The
classical Stable Marriage problem (sm) is the restriction of smi in which n1 = n2
and E = R×H.
Finally, the School Choice problem (sc) (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) is a one-sided preference version of hr where students
and schools replace residents and hospitals respectively, and schools are endowed
with priorities over students instead of preferences. A school’s priority ranking over
students may reflect a school district’s policy choice (e.g., by giving students who
are within walking distance or have a sibling in the same school a higher priority)
or they may be based on other factors (e.g., grades in an entrance exam, time spent
on a waiting list, etc.). For sc, schools are not considered to be economic agents:
they neither strategise nor is their welfare measured and taken into account. Many
results can easily be translated from hr to sc, but often the interpretation changes.
For instance, the notion of stability can be interpreted as the elimination of justified
envy (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999): a student can justifiably envy the assignment of
another student to a school if he likes that school better than his own assignment
and he has a higher priority (with a lower priority, envy might be present as well
but is not justifiable). Two recent and exhaustive surveys on school choice have
been written by Abdulkadirog˘lu (2013) and Pathak (2011).
14.2.2 Classical results: stability and Gale–Shapley algorithms
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that every instance I of hr admits at least one
stable matching. Their proof of this result was constructive, i.e., they described a
linear-time algorithm for finding a stable matching in I. Their algorithm is known
as the resident-oriented Gale–Shapley algorithm (or RGS algorithm for short), since
it involves residents applying to hospitals. Given an instance of hr,
(1) at the first step of the RGS algorithm, every resident applies to her favourite
acceptable hospital. For each hospital hj , the cj acceptable applicants who have
the highest ranks according to hj ’s preference list (or all acceptable applicants
if there are fewer than cj) are placed on the waiting list of hj , and all others
are rejected;
(l) at the l-th step of the RGS algorithm, those applicants who were rejected at
step l−1 apply to their next best acceptable hospital. For each hospital hj , the
cj acceptable applicants among the new applicants and those on the waiting list
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who have the highest ranks according to hj ’s preference list (or all acceptable
applicants if there are fewer than cj) are placed on the waiting list of hj , and
all others are rejected.
Example 14.2 (RGS algorithm) We now illustrate an execution of the RGS
algorithm for the hr instance shown in Example 14.1. In the first step, each of r1
and r2 applies to h1, and each of r3 and r4 applies to h2. Whilst h2 accepts each of
r3 and r4, h1 can only accept r2 (from among r1 and r2). Thus r1 is rejected by h1
and applies to the next hospital in his preference list, namely h2, at the second step.
At this point, h2 accepts r1, keeps r3, and rejects r4. In the third step, r4 applies to
h1 and is rejected again. Now the algorithm terminates since each resident is either
assigned to a hospital or has applied to every hospital on his preference list. The
resulting matching is thus M ′ = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h2)}, and the reader may
verify that M ′ is stable.
The RGS algorithm is well-defined and terminates with the unique resident-optimal
stable matching Ma that assigns to each resident the best hospital that she could
achieve in any stable matching, whilst each unassigned resident is unassigned in
every stable matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec.
1.6.3).
It is instructive to give a short sketch of the proof illustrating why Ma is stable.
For, consider any resident ri and suppose that hj is any hospital that ri prefers
to Ma(ri) (if ri is assigned in Ma) or hj is any hospital that ri finds acceptable
(if ri is unassigned in Ma). Then ri applied to hj during the execution of the
RGS algorithm, and was rejected by hj . This could only happen if hj was full and
preferred its worst assignee to hj at that point. But hj cannot subsequently lose
any residents and indeed can only potentially gain better assignees. Hence in Ma,
hj is full and prefers its worst assigned resident to ri. Thus (ri, hj) cannot block
Ma, and since ri and hj were arbitrary, Ma is stable.
Furthermore, Ma is worst-possible for the hospitals in a precise sense: if M is any
other stable matching then every hospital hj ∈ H prefers each resident in M(hj)
to each resident in Ma(hj)\M(hj) (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.6.5).
Theorem 14.3 (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989) Given an hr
instance, the RGS algorithm constructs, in O(m) time, the unique resident-optimal
stable matching, where m is the number of acceptable resident–hospital pairs.
A counterpart of the RGS algorithm, known as the hospital-oriented Gale–Shapley
algorithm, or HGS algorithm for short, involves hospitals offering posts to residents.
The HGS algorithm terminates with the unique hospital-optimal stable matching
Mz. In this matching, every full hospital hj ∈ H is assigned its cj best stable
partners, whilst every undersubscribed hospital is assigned the same set of residents
in every stable matching (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.6.2). Furthermore, Mz
assigns to each resident the worst hospital that she could achieve in any stable
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matching, whilst each unassigned resident is unassigned in every stable matching
(Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Theorem 1.6.1).
Theorem 14.4 (Gusfield and Irving, 1989) Given an instance of hr, the HGS
algorithm constructs, in O(m) time, the unique hospital-optimal stable matching,
where m is the number of acceptable resident–hospital pairs.
Note that the RGS / HGS algorithms are often referred to as deferred acceptance
algorithms by economists (Roth, 2008).
It is easy to check that for Example 14.2,Ma = M
′ = Mz. In general there may be
other stable matchings — possibly exponentially many (Irving and Leather, 1986)
— between the two extremes given by Ma and Mz. However some key structural
properties hold regarding unassigned residents and undersubscribed hospitals with
respect to all stable matchings in I, as follows.
Theorem 14.5 (Rural Hospitals Theorem: Roth 1984a; Gale and Sotomayor 1985;
Roth 1986) For a given instance of hr, the following properties hold:
1. the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings;
2. each hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings;
3. any hospital that is undersubscribed in one stable matching is assigned exactly
the same set of residents in all stable matchings.
The term “Rural Hospitals Theorem” stems from the tendency of rural hospitals
to have problems in recruiting residents to fill all available slots. The theorem’s
name then indicates the importance of the result to the rural hospitals’ recruitment
problem: under stability one can never choose matchings to help undersubscribed
rural hospitals to recruit more or better residents. Additional background to the
Rural Hospitals Theorem for hr is given by Gusfield and Irving (1989, Sec. 1.6.4).
A classical result in stable matching theory states that, for a given instance of
sm, the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice; Knuth (1976) attributed
this result to John Conway (see also Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.3.1). In fact
such a structure is also present for the set of stable matchings in a given instance
I of hr (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.6.5). To describe this structure, we will
define some preliminary notation and terminology.
Let S denote the set of stable matchings in I and let M,M ′ ∈ S. We say that
ri ∈ R prefers M to M ′ if ri is assigned in both M and M ′, and ri prefers M(ri)
to M ′(ri). Also, we say that ri is indifferent between M and M ′ if either (i) ri
is unassigned in both M and M ′, or (ii) ri is assigned in both M and M ′, and
M(ri) = M
′(ri). Then, M dominates M ′, denoted M M ′, if each resident either
prefers M to M ′, or is indifferent between them.
For M,M ′ ∈ S we denote by M ∧M ′ (respectively M ∨M ′) the set of resident-
hospital pairs in which either (i) ri is unassigned if she is unassigned in both M
and M ′, or (ii) ri is given the better (respectively poorer) of her partners in M and
M ′ if she is assigned in both stable matchings. It turns out that each of M ∧M ′
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and M ∨M ′ is a stable matching in I, representing the join and the meet of M
and M ′ respectively (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.6.5). These operations give
rise to a lattice structure for S, as the following result indicates.
Theorem 14.6 (Gusfield and Irving, 1989) Let I be an instance of hr, and let
S be the set of stable matchings in I. Then (S,) forms a distributive lattice, with
M ∧ M ′ representing the meet, and M ∨ M ′ the join, for two stable matchings
M,M ′ ∈ S, where  is the dominance partial order on S.
14.2.3 Strategic results: strategy-proofness
Note that both the RGS and HGS algorithms are described in terms of agents taking
actions based on their preference lists (one side proposes and the other side tenta-
tively accepts or rejects these proposals). However, unless agents have an incentive
to truthfully report their preferences, any preference-based requirement (such as
stability) might lose some of its meaning. The following theorem demonstrates that
in general, stability is not compatible with the requirement that for all agents truth
telling is a weakly dominant strategy (strategy-proofness).
To be more precise, we call a function that assigns a matching to each instance
of hr (or smi / sm) a mechanism. A mechanism that assigns only stable matchings
is called stable. The mechanism that always assigns the resident-optimal (hospital-
optimal) stable matching is called the RGS (HGS ) mechanism.
A mechanism for which no single agent can ever benefit from misrepresenting
her/its preferences is called strategy-proof , i.e., in game-theoretic terms, it is a
weakly dominant strategy for each agent to report her/its true preference list. If
we restrict preference misrepresentations to one type of agents only, we obtain the
one-sided versions of strategy-proofness: a mechanism for which no single resident
can ever benefit from misrepresenting her preferences is called strategy-proof for
residents. Strategy-proofness for hospitals is similarly defined.
Theorem 14.7 (Impossibility Theorem: Roth 1982a) There exists no mechanism
for smi that is stable and strategy-proof.
As smi is a special case of hr, Theorem 14.7 clearly extends to the hr case. The
proof of Theorem 14.7 can be shown with the following example.
Example 14.8 (Impossibility) Consider the following instance:
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : r2 r1
r2 : h2 h1 h2 : r1 r2
The two stable matchings for this instance are Ma = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2)} and Mz =
{(r1, h2), (r2, h1)}. Assume that the mechanism picks stable matching Ma. Then, if
h1 pretended that only r2 is acceptable, Ma is not stable anymore and the stable
mechanism would have to pick the only remaining stable matching Mz, which h1
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would prefer; a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Similarly, if the mechanism
picks stable matching Mz, r1 could manipulate by declaring h1 uniquely acceptable.
The intuition behind this impossibility result is that an agent who is assigned to
a stable partner that is not her/its best stable partner can improve her/its outcome
by truncating the preference list just below the best stable partner: this unilateral
manipulation will result in the assignment of the best stable partner to the agent
who misrepresented her/its preference list. Alcalde and Barbera` (1994) and Takagi
and Serizawa (2010) further strengthened the impossibility result by considerably
weakening the stability requirement.
On the positive side, stable mechanisms that respect strategy-proofness for all
residents exist.
Theorem 14.9 (Roth, 1985) The RGS mechanism for hr is strategy-proof for
residents.
As hr is a generalisation of each of sm and smi, clearly Theorem 14.9 also holds in
these latter contexts. This theorem for hr is an extension of an earlier correspond-
ing theorem for sm (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982b). Strategy-proofness
for all residents also turns out to be a key property in characterising the RGS
mechanism (Ehlers and Klaus, 2014): almost all real-life mechanisms used in vari-
ants of hr (including sc) — including the large classes of priority mechanisms and
linear programming mechanisms — satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties,
but once strategy-proofness is added to these properties, the RGS mechanism is
the only one surviving (and characterised by the respective properties including
strategy-proofness). For sc, since residents (aka students) are the only economic
agents, Theorem 14.9 in fact establishes a possibility result. For hr, the negative
result of Theorem 14.7 persists even if restricting attention only to hospitals.
Theorem 14.10 (Roth, 1986) There exists no mechanism for hr that is stable
and strategy-proof for hospitals.
This result implies that even when the HGS mechanism is used, hospitals might
have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences.
Once the incompatibility of stability and strategy-proofness is established (The-
orems 14.7 and 14.10), the question arises as to whether we can at least find stable
mechanisms that are resistant to strategic behaviour, meaning that it is computa-
tionally difficult (i.e., NP-hard) for agents to behave strategically. This approach
is typical in voting theory, which is the subject of Chapter 6 (Conitzer and Walsh,
2015) on Barriers to Manipulation, since no voting rule is strategy-proof (Arrow
et al., 2002; Bartholdi et al., 1989). It is possible to exploit such results to define sta-
ble mechanisms that are resistant to strategic behaviour. Pini et al. (2011) showed
how to take voting rules that are resistant to strategic behaviour and use them to
define stable mechanisms with the same property.
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Besides worst-case analysis, we may also consider the occurrence and impact of
strategic behaviour when stable matching mechanisms are used in real-world in-
stances of hr. Roth and Peranson (1999) showed that, for data from the NRMP,
only a few participants could improve their outcomes by changing their preference
list. They also showed via simulations that the opportunities for manipulation di-
minish when the instances of hr grow larger in population. Since then, various
articles have provided theoretical explanations for this phenomenon for large pop-
ulation instances of smi or hr (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak,
2009; Lee, 2014).
14.2.4 Further algorithmic results
Decentralised algorithms for smi
In Section 14.2.2 we described the Gale–Shapley algorithm, which can be regarded
as a centralised algorithm for hr. There has also been much interest in the study
of decentralised algorithms for finding stable matchings. In particular, Roth and
Vande Vate (1990) studied a mechanism for smi that involves starting from some
initial matching M0 (which need not be stable) and constructing a random sequence
of matchings M0,M1,M2 . . . , where for each i ≥ 1, Mi is obtained from Mi−1
by satisfying a blocking pair (m,w) of Mi−1 (that is, the partners of m and w
in Mi−1, if they exist, are both single in Mi, and (m,w) is added to Mi). The
blocking pair that is satisfied at each step is chosen at random, subject to the
constraint that there is a positive probability that any particular blocking pair
(from among those that exist at a given step) is chosen. Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) showed that this random sequence converges to a stable matching with
probability 1. The algorithm underlying their result became known as the Roth-
Vande Vate Mechanism. The special case of this mechanism in which M0 = ∅ (and
some other subtle modifications are made) has been referred to as the Random
Order Mechanism (Ma, 1996).
When satisfying a blocking pair (m,w), if the ‘divorcees’ (M(w) and M(m)) are
required to marry one another then the situation is very different. In this case there
are sm instances and initial matchings M0 such that it is not possible to transform
M0 to a stable matching by satisfying a sequence of blocking pairs (Tamura, 1993;
Tan and Su, 1995).
Ackermann et al. (2011) categorised decentralised algorithms for smi into better
response dynamics and best response dynamics. The former description applies to
mechanisms that are based on satisfying blocking pairs, whilst the latter refers
to a more specific mechanism where, should a blocking pair be satisfied, it is the
best blocking pair for the active agent (i.e., the agent who makes the proposal). The
authors also considered random better response dynamics and random best response
dynamics. In the former case, a blocking pair is chosen uniformly at random, whilst
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in the latter case, a blocking pair that corresponds to the best blocking pair for a
given proposer is selected uniformly at random. The authors gave exponential lower
bounds for the convergence time of both approaches in uncoordinated markets.
Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties
In the context of centralised clearinghouses for junior doctor allocation, often large
hospitals have many applicants and may find it difficult to produce a strict ranking
over all these residents. In practice a hospital may be indifferent between batches
of residents, represented by ties in its preference list. This naturally leads to the
Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties (hrt), the generalisation of hr in which
the preference lists of both residents and hospitals can contain ties.
In the hrt context, several stability definitions have been formulated in the
literature, with varying degrees of strength. A matching M is weakly stable if there
is no resident–hospital pair (r, h), such that by coming together, each would be
strictly better off than their current situation in M . In the case of strong stability,
in a blocking pair (r, h) it is enough for one of (r, h) to be strictly better off, whilst
the other must be no worse off, by forming a partnership. Finally, in the case of
super-stability, all we require is that each of (r, h) must be no worse off.
Example 14.11 (hrt instance) To illustrate these stability concepts, we insert
some ties into the preference lists in the hr instance shown in Example 14.1. The
resulting instance of hrt is
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : 1 : r3 (r2 r1) r4
r2 : h1 h2 h3 h2 : 2 : r2 (r3 r1 r4)
r3 : h2 (h1 h3) h3 : 1 : r2 r3
r4 : h2 h1
Here, parentheses indicate ties in the preference lists, so for example, r3 prefers h2 to
each of h1 and h3, and is indifferent between the latter two hospitals. The matchings
{(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h2)} and {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3), (r4, h2)} are both weakly
stable, but the instance admits no strongly-stable matching, and hence no super-
stable matching either.
We continue by considering algorithmic results for hrt under weak stability.
Firstly, an hrt instance is bound to admit a weakly stable matching, and such a
matching can be found in linear time (Irving et al., 2000). Recall from Theorem 14.5
that all stable matchings in an hr instance have the same size. However in the case
of hrt, weakly stable matchings may have different sizes, as illustrated by Example
14.11. Often in the case of centralised clearinghouses, an important consideration is
to match as many participants as possible. This motivates max hrt, the problem of
finding a maximum weakly stable matching, given an hrt instance. This problem is
NP-hard (Iwama et al., 1999; Manlove et al., 2002) even if each hospital has capacity
1, and also even under severe restrictions on the number, length and positions of
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the ties (Manlove et al., 2002). A succession of approximation algorithms has been
proposed in the literature for various restrictions of max hrt, culminating in the
best current bound of 3/2 for the general problem (McDermid, 2009; Kira´ly, 2013;
Paluch, 2014).
Although an hrt instance I is bound to admit a weakly stable matching as
mentioned above, by contrast a strongly stable matching or a super-stable matching
in I may not exist (Irving et al., 2000, 2003). However there is an efficient algorithm
to find a strongly stable matching or report that none exists (Kavitha et al., 2007).
A faster and simpler algorithm exists in the case of super-stability (Irving et al.,
2000). Moreover an analogue of Theorem 14.5 holds in hrt under each of the strong
stability and super-stability criteria (Scott, 2005; Irving et al., 2000).
Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples
Another variant of hr that is motivated by practical applications arises in the
presence of couples. These are pairs of residents who wish to be jointly assigned to
hospitals via a common preferences list over pairs of hospitals, typically in order
to be geographically close to one another. Each couple (ri, rj) has a preference list
over a subset of H × H, where each pair (hp, hq) on this list represents the joint
assignment of ri to hp and rj to hq. (There may be single residents in addition, as
before.) We thus obtain the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc).
Relative to a suitable stability definition, Roth (1984a) showed that an hrc
instance need not admit a stable matching. Ng and Hirschberg (1988) and Ronn
(1990) independently showed that the problem of deciding whether an hrc instance
admits a stable matching is NP-complete, even if each hospital has capacity 1 and
there are no single residents.
McDermid and Manlove (2010) considered a variant of hrc in which each resident
(whether single or in a couple) has a preference list over individual hospitals, and
the joint preference list of each couple (ri, rj) is consistent with the individual
lists of ri and rj in a precise sense. Relative to Roth’s stability definition (Roth,
1984a), they showed that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists
is NP-complete. However if instead we enforce classical (Gale–Shapley) stability on
a given matching relative to the individual lists of residents, then the problem of
finding a stable matching or reporting that none exists is solvable in polynomial
time (McDermid and Manlove, 2010).
Biro´ et al. (2011) developed a range of heuristics for the problem of finding a
stable matching or reporting that none exists in a given hrc instance, and subjected
them to a detailed empirical evaluation based on randomly-generated data. They
found that a stable matching is very likely to exist for instances where the ratio of
couples to single residents is small and of the magnitude typically found in practical
applications.
Ashlagi et al. (2014) studied large random matching markets with couples. They
introduced a new matching algorithm and showed that if the number of couples
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grows slower than the size of the market, a stable matching will be found with high
probability. If however, the number of couples grows at a linear rate, with constant
probability (not depending on the market size), no stable matching exists.
Further results for hrc are described in the survey paper of Biro´ and Klijn (2013).
Many-to-many stable matching
Many-to-many extensions of sm (and by implication hr) have been considered in
the literature (Roth, 1984b; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Sotomayor, 1999; Ba¨ıou and
Balinski, 2000; Fleiner, 2003; Mart´ınez et al., 2004; Echenique and Oviedo, 2006;
Bansal et al., 2007; Kojima and U¨nver, 2008; Eirinakis et al., 2012, 2013; Klijn
and Yazıcı, 2014). These matching problems tend to be described in the context
of assigning workers to firms, where each agent can be multiply assigned (up to a
given capacity). We will discuss the two main models of many-to-many matching
in the literature.
The first version we consider, which we refer to as the Workers / Firms problem,
Version 1, denoted by wf-1, involves each worker ranking in strict order of prefer-
ence a set of individual acceptable firms, and vice versa for each firm. Ba¨ıou and
Balinski (2000) generalised the stability definition for sm to the wf-1 case. They
showed that every instance I of wf-1 has a stable matching and such a matching
can be found in O(n2) time, where n = max{n1, n2}, n1 is the number of workers
and n2 is the number of firms in I. They also generalised Theorems 14.5 and 14.6
to the wf-1 context. Additional algorithms have been given for computing stable
matchings with various optimality properties in wf-1 (Bansal et al., 2007; Eirinakis
et al., 2012, 2013).
In the second version, which we refer to as the Workers / Firms problem, Version
2, denoted by wf-2, each worker ranks in strict order of preference acceptable
subsets of firms, and vice versa for each firm. Two main forms of stability have
been studied in the context of wf-2, namely pairwise stability and setwise stability.
A matching M in a wf-2 instance is pairwise stable (Roth, 1984b) if it can-
not be undermined by a single worker–firm pair acting together. A wf-2 instance
need not admit a pairwise stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Exam-
ple 2.7). However Roth (1984b) proved that, given an instance of wf-2 where every
agent’s preference list satisfies so-called substitutability (Kelso and Crawford, 1982),
a pairwise stable matching always exists, and he gave an algorithm for finding one.
Mart´ınez et al. (2004) gave an algorithm for finding all pairwise stable matchings.
A more powerful definition of stability is setwise stability. Informally, a matching
M is setwise stable (Sotomayor, 1999) if it cannot be undermined by a coalition
of workers and firms acting together. More precisely, several definitions of setwise
stability have been given in the literature (Sotomayor, 1999; Echenique and Oviedo,
2006; Konishi and U¨nver, 2006); the various alternatives were formally defined and
analysed by Klaus and Walzl (2009).
Bansal et al. (2007) noted that, generally speaking, wf-1 has been studied mainly
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by the computer science community, whilst the economics community has mainly
focused on wf-2. One reason for this is that wf-2 suffers from the drawback that
the length of an agent’s preference list is in the worst case exponential in the number
of agents. A consequence of this is that the practical applicability of any algorithm
for wf-2 would be severely limited in general, however this problem does not arise
with wf-1.
14.3 One-sided preferences
14.3.1 Introduction and preliminary definitions
Many economists and game theorists, and increasingly computer scientists in recent
years, have studied the problem of allocating a set H of indivisible goods among a
set A of applicants (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Deng
et al., 2003; Fekete et al., 2003). Each applicant ai may have ordinal preferences
over a subset of H (the acceptable goods for ai). Many models have considered the
case where there is no monetary transfer. In the literature the situation in which
each applicant initially owns one good is known as a Housing Market (hm)3 (Shap-
ley and Scarf, 1974; Roth and Postlewaite, 1977; Roth, 1982a). When there are
no initial property rights, we obtain the House Allocation problem (ha) (Hylland
and Zeckhauser, 1979; Zhou, 1990; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998). A mixed
model, in which a subset of applicants initially owns a good has also been studied
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999).
House Allocation problems
Formally, an instance I of the House Allocation problem (ha) comprises a set A =
{a1, a2, . . . , an1} of applicants and a set H = {h1, h2, . . . , hn2} of houses. The agents
in I are the applicants and houses in A∪H. There is a set E ⊆ A×H of acceptable
applicant–house pairs. Let m = |E|. Each applicant ai ∈ A has an acceptable set of
houses A(ai), where A(ai) = {hj ∈ H : (ai, hj) ∈ E}. Similarly each house hj ∈ H
has an acceptable set of applicants A(hj), where A(hj) = {ai ∈ A : (ai, hj) ∈ E}.
Each applicant ai ∈ A has a preference list in which she ranks A(ai) in strict
order. Given any applicant ai ∈ A, and given any houses hj , hk ∈ H, ai is said
to prefer hj to hk if {hj , hk} ⊆ A(ai), and hj precedes hk on ai’s preference list.
Houses do not have preference lists over applicants, and it is essentially this feature
that distinguishes ha from smi.
ha is a very general problem model and any application domain having an un-
derlying matching problem that is bipartite, where agents in only one of the sets
have preferences over the other, can be viewed as an instance of ha. These include
3 This problem is also referred to as the House-swapping Game in the literature.
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the problems of allocating graduates to trainee positions, students to projects, pro-
fessors to offices, clients to servers, etc. The literature concerning ha has largely
described this problem model in terms of assigning applicants to houses, so for
consistency we also adopt this terminology.
An assignment M in I is a subset of E. The definitions of the terms assigned
to, assigned, unassigned and assignees relative to M are analogous to the same
definitions in the hr case (see Section 14.2.1). A matching M in I is an assignment
such that, for each pk ∈ A∪H, the set of assignees of pk in M , denoted by M(pk),
satisfies |M(pk)| ≤ 1. For notational convenience, as in the hr case, if pk is assigned
in M then where there is no ambiguity the notation M(pk) is also used to refer to
the single member of the set M(pk). Let M denote the set of matchings in I.
Given two matchings M andM ′ inM, we say that an applicant ai ∈ A prefers M ′
to M if either (i) ai is assigned in M
′ and unassigned in M , or (ii) ai is assigned in
both M and M ′, and ai prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). We say that M ′ Pareto dominates
M if (i) some applicant prefers M ′ to M and (ii) no applicant prefers M to M ′. A
matching M ∈ M is Pareto optimal if there is no matching M ′ ∈ M that Pareto
dominates M . Intuitively M is Pareto optimal if no applicant ai can be better
off without requiring another applicant aj to be worse off. For example, M is not
Pareto optimal if two applicants could improve by swapping the houses that they
are assigned to in M .
Housing Markets
An instance I of a Housing Market (hm) comprises an ha instance I where n1 = n2,
together with a matching M0 in I (the initial endowment) such that |M0| = n1.
A matching M in I is individually rational if, for each applicant ai ∈ A, either
ai prefers M(ai) to M0(ai), or M(ai) = M0(ai). Since we are only interested in
individually rational matchings, we assume that M0(ai) is the last house on ai’s
preference list, for each ai ∈ A. Clearly then, any individually rational matching
M in I satisfies |M | = n1.
The notion of Pareto optimality in ha is closely related to the concept of core
matchings in the hm context (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977): let I be an instance
of hm where M0 is the initial endowment, and let M be an individually rational
matching in I. Let M ′ be a matching in I, and let S be the set of applicants who
are assigned in M ′. Then M ′ weakly blocks M with respect to the coalition S if:
(i) the members of the coalition are only allowed to improve by exchanging their
own resources (via their initial endowment M0): {M ′(ai) : ai ∈ S} = {M0(ai) :
ai ∈ S};
(ii) some member of the coalition ai ∈ S is better off in M ′: some ai ∈ S prefers
M ′(ai) to M(ai);
(iii) no member of the coalition ai ∈ S is worse off in M ′ than in M : no ai ∈ S
prefers M(ai) to M
′(ai).
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M is a strict core matching , or M is in the strict core, if there is no other matching in
I that weakly blocksM . AlsoM ′ strongly blocks M with respect to S if Condition (i)
above is satisfied, and in addition, every ai ∈ S prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). M is a
weak core matching , or M is in the weak core, if there is no other matching in I
that strongly blocks M .
Note that M is Pareto optimal if and only if M is not weakly blocked by any
matching M ′ such that |M ′| = n1 (here the coalition comprises all applicants and is
referred to as the grand coalition). Hence a strict core matching is Pareto optimal.
Example 14.12 (hm instance) Consider the following hm instance in which the
initial endowment is M0 = {(a1, h4), (a2, h3), (a3, h2), (a4, h1)}.
a1 : h1 h2 h3 h4
a2 : h1 h2 h4 h3
a3 : h4 h1 h3 h2
a4 : h4 h3 h2 h1
Now define the matchings M = {(a1, h4), (a2, h3), (a3, h1), (a4, h2)}, M ′ =
{(a1, h3), (a2, h2), (a3, h4), (a4, h1)} and M ′′ = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2), (a3, h3), (a4, h4)}.
Then M ′ strongly blocks M with respect to the coalition S = {a1, a2, a3}, whilst
M ′′ is a strict core matching and hence Pareto optimal.
We call a function that assigns a matching to each instance of ha (or hm) a
mechanism. A mechanism that assigns only Pareto optimal matchings is called
Pareto optimal.
14.3.2 Classical structural and algorithmic results
House Allocation problems
All Pareto optimal matchings can be constructed using a classical algorithm called
the Serial (SD) Dictatorship Algorithm (see Theorem 14.14). For any fixed or-
der of applicants f = (i1, i2, ..., in1), the SD algorithm is a straightforward greedy
algorithm that takes each applicant in turn and assigns her to the most-preferred
available house on her preference list. The associated mechanism is called the Serial
Dictatorship (SD) mechanism. The order in which the applicants are processed will,
in general, affect the outcome. If a uniform lottery is used in order to determine the
applicant ordering, then we obtain a random mechanism called the Random Serial
Dictatorship Mechanism or RSD mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998).
Often, the fixed order of applicants used for the SD mechanism is determined in
some objective way. Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Example 4.3) remark that when
the United States Naval Academy matches graduating students to their first posts
as Naval Officers using an approach based on the SD algorithm, students are con-
sidered in non-decreasing order of graduation results. Clearly the SD algorithm
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may be implemented to execute in O(m) time (m being the number of acceptable
applicant–house pairs).
Strictly speaking RSD produces a probability distribution over matchings, and its
output can be regarded as a bi-stochastic n1×n2 matrixM in which entry (i, j) gives
the probability of applicant ai receiving house hj . Independently, Aziz et al. (2013)
and Saban and Sethuraman (2013) proved that computing M is #P-complete.
Saban and Sethuraman (2013) also proved the surprising result that determining
whether a given entry (i, j) in M has positive probability is NP-complete. This im-
plies NP-completeness for the problem of determining whether, given an applicant
ai and house hj , there exists a Pareto optimal matching containing (ai, hj).
Krysta et al. (2014) gave an O(n21γ) strategy-proof adaptation of RSD to the
more general extension of ha in which preference lists may include ties, where γ is
the maximum length of a tie in any applicants preference list.
Housing Markets
For a somewhat more general housing market model that allows for indifferences
in preference lists, Shapley and Scarf (1974) showed that the weak core is always
non-empty by constructing a weak core matching using Gale’s Top Trading Cycles
or TTC algorithm (the authors attributed the now famous TTC algorithm to David
Gale). They also showed that the weak core matching constructed is a competitive
allocation,4 the strict core may be empty and the non-empty weak core may exceed
the (not necessarily singleton) set of competitive allocations. Note that for our
housing market model with strict preferences, the weak and the strict core coincide.
Given an instance of hm with initial endowment M0,
(1) at the first step of the TTC algorithm, every applicant points to the owner of her
favourite house (possibly to herself). Since there are finitely many applicants,
there is at least one cycle (where a cycle is an ordered list (i1, i2, ..., ik), 1 ≤
k ≤ n1, of applicants with each applicant pointing to the next applicant in
the list and applicant aik pointing to applicant ai1 ; k = 1 is the special case
of a self-loop where an applicant points to herself). In each cycle the implied
cyclical exchange of houses is implemented and the algorithm continues with
the remaining applicants and houses;
(l) at the l-th step of the TTC algorithm, every remaining applicant points to the
owner of her favourite remaining house (possibly to herself). Again, there is
at least one cycle and in each cycle the implied cyclical exchange of houses is
implemented and the algorithm continues with the remaining applicants and
houses, and terminates when no applicants remain.
4 While housing markets are modelled as pure exchange economies, a competitive allocation of a
housing market can be defined using fiat money. Then, an allocation is competitive if there exists a
price for each house such that, by selling his house at the given price, each agent can afford to buy
his most-preferred house (i.e., market clearance ensues).
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Note that there is an equivalent two-sided formulation of the TTC algorithm in
which agents point to houses as specified above and houses will always point to their
owners. The TTC algorithm can be implemented to run in O(m) time (m being
the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs) (Abraham et al., 2004). Roth and
Postlewaite (1977) demonstrated that the matching found by the TTC algorithm is
the unique strict core allocation as well as the unique competitive allocation. The
mechanism that assigns to each instance of hm the strict core matching obtained
by the TTC algorithm is called the Core Mechanism or sometimes simply the Core.
Example 14.13 We apply the TTC algorithm to the hm instance shown in Ex-
ample 14.12. The initial directed graph has four nodes (representing all applicants)
where each applicants points to the owner (in M0) of its most preferred house.
Hence there is a directed arc from a1 to a4, from a2 to a4, from a3 to a1, and from
a4 to a1. Since there is a cycle involving a1 and a4, we swap their houses, and thus
a1 receives h1 and a4 receives h4. Now we delete a1 and a4 from the graph, as well
as their houses from the hm instance. We are thus left with a2 and a3, with an arc
from a2 to a3 (since after having deleted h1, the most preferred house of a2 is h2,
owned by a3) and similarly an arc from a3 to a2. Thus we swap their houses and the
algorithm stops, returning the matching M ′′ = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2), (a3, h3), (a4, h4)}
as in Example 14.12.
Recall that the only difference between an instance of ha and an instance of hm
is that in the latter case an initial endowment matching M0 is given as well. Hence,
we could define a mechanism for ha that fixes an initial endowment matching
Mf and then uses the Core mechanism for the obtained instance of hm. We call
such a mechanism a Core from Fixed Endowments or CFE mechanism. If now
a uniform lottery is used in order to determine the initial endowment matching,
then we obtain a random mechanism called the Core from Random Endowments or
CRE mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998). Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(1998) proved that the two random mechanisms we have introduced are equivalent.
Theorem 14.14 (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998) 1. All SD mechanisms for
ha are Pareto optimal. For each Pareto optimal matching M of an instance of
ha, there exists an order of applicants such that the corresponding SD mechanism
assigns M .
2. All Core mechanisms for hm are Pareto optimal. For each Pareto optimal match-
ing M of an instance of ha, there exists an initial endowment matching Mf such
that the CFE mechanism assigns M .
3. The CRE and the RSD mechanisms for ha are equivalent.
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) had already shown that the RSD mechanism is
ex-post Pareto optimal, i.e., the final matching that is chosen by the RSD lottery
is Pareto optimal. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that the RSD mecha-
nism, however, is not ex-ante or ordinally efficient (Pareto optimal), i.e., for some
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lotteries chosen by the RSD mechanism there exist Pareto dominating lotteries
(with stochastic dominance being used to formulate the dominance relation). They
also suggested a new random mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, that
satisfies ex-ante efficiency.
14.3.3 Strategic results: strategy-proofness
As in Section 14.2.1, a mechanism for which no single applicant can ever benefit
from misrepresenting her preferences is called strategy-proof (i.e., in game-theoretic
terms, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each applicant to report her true pref-
erence list). All mechanisms introduced so far in this section are strategy-proof, as
the following results indicate.
Theorem 14.15 (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) The SD mechanisms for ha are
strategy-proof.
Theorem 14.16 (Roth, 1982a) The Core mechanism for hm is strategy-proof.
Hence, all CFE mechanisms for ha are strategy-proof.
In addition, the Core and CFE mechanisms are group strategy-proof (i.e., no
coalition of applicants can jointly misrepresent their true preferences in order for at
least one member of the coalition to improve, whilst no other coalition member is
worse off; see, e.g., Svensson, 1999). Strategy-proofness is also one of the properties
that characterise the Core mechanism.
Theorem 14.17 (Ma, 1994) The Core mechanism for hm is the only mechanism
that is Pareto optimal, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) extended Ma’s characterisation result to a
mixed model that combines ha and hm: in the House Allocation problem with
Existing Tenants, a subset of applicants initially owns a house. They defined mech-
anisms that combine elements of SD as well as Core mechanisms based on the
so-called YRMH-IGYT (You Request My House – I Get Your Turn) algorithm.
All YRMH-IGYT mechanisms are strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and individually
rational (in the sense that no existing tenant receives a house inferior to his own).
In Section 14.2.1 we introduced sc as a one-sided preference variant of hr, but
we could also introduce this class of problems as a variant of ha with the addi-
tional properties that objects (i.e., houses/schools) have priorities over students,
and objects can be multiply assigned up to some capacity. Either way, the RGS
mechanism can be used to find a matching for each instance of sc. This mechanism
is then strategy-proof (by Theorem 14.9) and stable (Gale and Shapley, 1962), but
it is not Pareto optimal. In fact, no mechanism is both stable and Pareto optimal
(Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999). However it turns out that no other stable mechanism
would do better in the following sense.
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a1 : h1 h2 a1 : h1 h2 h3 a1 : h1 h3
a2 : h1 a2 : h1 h2 h3 a2 : h2 h1
a3 : h1 h2 h3 a3 : h2
Figure 14.1 (a) ha instance I1 (b) ha instance I2 (c) ha instance I3
Theorem 14.18 (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) The RGS mechanism for sc Pareto
dominates any other stable mechanism.
Finally, when focusing on strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality only, no bet-
ter mechanism than the RGS mechanism emerges.
Theorem 14.19 (Kesten, 2010) The RGS mechanism for sc is not Pareto-
dominated by any other Pareto optimal mechanism that is strategy-proof.
14.3.4 Further algorithmic results
Pareto optimal matchings
For a given instance of ha, Pareto optimal matchings may have different sizes, as
illustrated by Figure 14.1(a): for the instance I1 shown, matchings M1 = {(a1, h1)}
and M2 = {(a1, h2), (a2, h1)} are both Pareto optimal. In many applications we seek
to match as many applicants as possible. This motivates the problem of finding a
Pareto optimal matching of maximum size, which we refer to as a maximum Pareto
optimal matching.
Towards an algorithm for this problem, Abraham et al. (2004) gave a charac-
terisation of Pareto optimal matchings in a given ha instance I. A matching M
in I is maximal if there is no pair (ai, hj) ∈ E, both of which are unassigned in
M . Also M is trade-in-free if there is no pair (ai, hj) ∈ E such that hj is unas-
signed in M , and ai is assigned in M and prefers hj to M(ai). Finally M is cyclic
coalition-free if M admits no cyclic coalition, which is a sequence of applicants
C = 〈ai0 , ai1 , . . . , air−1〉, for some r ≥ 2, all assigned in M , such that aij prefers
M(aij+1) to M(aij ) (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) (with subscripts taken modulo r). Abraham
et al. gave the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a matching to be
Pareto optimal in terms of these concepts:
Proposition 14.20 (Abraham et al., 2004) Let I be an instance of ha and let
M be a matching in I. Then M is Pareto optimal if and only if M is maximal,
trade-in-free and coalition-free. Moreover there is an O(m) algorithm for testing M
for Pareto optimality, where m is the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs
in I.
Abraham et al. also gave a three-phase algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto
optimal matching in I, with each phase enforcing one of the conditions for Pareto
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optimality given in Proposition 14.20. In Phase 1 they construct a maximum match-
ing M in the underlying graph of I, which is the bipartite graph with vertex set
A∪H and edge set E. This step can be accomplished in O(√n1m) time and ensures
that M is maximal. Phase 2 is based on an O(m) algorithm in which assigned ap-
plicants repeatedly trade in their own house in M for any preferred vacant house.
Once this step terminates, M is trade-in-free. Finally, cyclic coalitions are elim-
inated during Phase 3, which is based on an O(m) implementation of the TTC
algorithm. Putting these three phases together, they obtained the following result.
Theorem 14.21 (Abraham et al., 2004) Let I be an instance of ha. A maximum
Pareto optimal matching in I can be found in O(
√
n1m) time, where n1 is the
number of applicants and m is the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs in I.
Popular matchings
Pareto optimality is a fundamental solution concept, but on its own it is a rela-
tively weak property. A stronger notion is that of a popular matching . Intuitively
a matching M in an ha instance I is popular if there is no other matching that
is preferred to M by a majority of the applicants who are not indifferent between
the two matchings. This concept was first defined by Ga¨rdenfors (1975) (using the
term majority assignment) in the context of smi.
To define the popular matching concept more formally, let M,M ′ ∈ M, and let
P (M,M ′) denote the set of applicants who prefer M to M ′. We say that M ′ is
more popular than M , denoted M ′  M , if |P (M ′,M)| > |P (M,M ′)|. Define a
matching M ∈ M to be popular (Abraham et al., 2007b) if M is -maximal (i.e.,
there is no other matching M ′ ∈M such that M ′ M).
Clearly a matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching M ′ such
that |P (M,M ′)| = 0 and |P (M ′,M)| ≥ 1. Hence a popular matching is Pareto op-
timal. However in contrast to the case for Pareto optimal matchings, an ha instance
need not admit a popular matching. To see this, consider the ha instance I2 shown
in Figure 14.1(b). It is clear that a matching in I2 cannot be popular unless all ap-
plicants are assigned. The unique matching up to symmetry in which all applicants
are assigned is M = {(ai, hi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3}, however M ′ = {(a2, h1), (a3, h2)} is
preferred by two applicants, which is a majority. The relation  in this case cycles,
hence the absence of a -maximal solution (therefore, in general,  is not a partial
order on M).
The potential absence of a popular matching in a given ha instance can be
related all the way back to the observation of Condorcet (1785) that, given k voters
who each rank n candidates in strict order of preference, there may not exist a
“winner”, namely a candidate who beats all others in a pairwise majority vote. See
also Chapter 2 (Zwicker, 2015).
Abraham et al. (2007b) derived a neat characterisation of popular matchings,
leading to an O(m) algorithm to check whether a given matching M in I is popular.
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The same characterisation also led naturally to an O(n+m) algorithm for finding
a popular matching or reporting that none exists, where n = n1 + n2. We remark
that popular matchings in I can have different sizes, and the authors showed how
to extend their algorithm in order to find a maximum popular matching without
altering the time complexity. This discussion can be summarised as follows.
Theorem 14.22 (Abraham et al., 2007b) Let I be an instance of ha. There is
an O(n+m) algorithm to find a maximum popular matching in I or report that no
popular matching exists, where n is the number of applicants and houses, and m is
the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs.
A more complex algorithm, with O(
√
nm) complexity, can be used to find a
maximum popular matching in I or report that no popular matching exists, in the
case that preference lists include ties (Abraham et al., 2007b).
McDermid and Irving (2011) showed that the set of popular matchings in an
ha instance can be characterised succinctly via a structure known as the switch-
ing graph. Using this representation they showed that a number of problems can be
solved efficiently, including counting popular matchings, sampling a popular match-
ing uniformly at random, listing all popular matchings and finding various types of
“optimal” popular matchings.
As a given ha instance need not admit a popular matching, it is natural to
weaken the notion of popularity, and seek matchings that are as popular as possible
in cases where a popular matching does not exist. To this end, McCutchen (2008)
defined two versions of near-popular matchings, namely a least unpopularity factor
matching and a least unpopularity margin matching. Also Kavitha et al. (2011)
studied the concept of a popular mixed matching, which is a probability distribution
over matchings that is popular in a precise sense.
Profile-based optimal matchings
Further notions of optimality are based on the profile p(M) of a matching M in an
ha instance I. Informally, p(M) is an r-tuple whose ith component is the number
of applicants who have their ith-choice house, where r is the maximum length of
an applicant’s preference list.
A matching M is rank-maximal (Irving et al., 2006) if p(M) is lexicographically
maximum, taken over all matchings inM. Intuitively, in such a matching, the max-
imum number of applicants are assigned to their first-choice house, and subject to
this condition, the maximum number of applicants are assigned to their second-
choice house, and so on. A rank-maximal matching need not be of maximum cardi-
nality. To see this, consider the ha instance I3 in Figure 14.1(c) and the following
matchings in I3: M1 = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2)} and M2 = {(a1, h3), (a2, h1), (a3, h2)}.
Clearly M1 is rank-maximal and |M1| = 2, whereas |M2| = 3.
In many applications we seek to assign as many applicants as possible. With this
in mind, consider M+, the set of maximum matchings in a given ha instance I.
24 B. Klaus, D.F. Manlove and F. Rossi
A greedy maximum matching is a matching M ∈ M+ such that p(M) is lexico-
graphically maximum, taken over all matchings in M+. Both rank-maximal and
greedy maximum matchings maximise the number of applicants with their sth-
choice house as a higher priority than maximising the number of those with their
tth-choice house, for any 1 ≤ s < t ≤ r. As a consequence, both of these types of
matchings could end up assigning applicants to houses relatively low down on their
preference lists.
Consequently, define a generous maximum matching to be a matching M ∈M+
such that pR(M) is lexicographically minimum, taken over all matchings in M+,
where pR(M) is the reverse of p(M). That is, M is a maximum cardinality matching
that assigns the minimum number of applicants to their rth-choice house, and
subject to this, the minimum number to their (r − 1)th-choice house, and so on.
We collectively refer to rank-maximal, greedy maximum and generous maximum
matchings as profile-based optimal matchings. Returning to instance I3 shown in
Figure 14.1(c), the matching M2 defined above is the unique maximum match-
ing and is therefore both a greedy maximum matching and a generous maximum
matching.
The following results indicate the complexity of the fastest current algorithms for
constructing rank-maximal, greedy maximum and generous maximum matchings
in a given ha instance.
Theorem 14.23 (Irving et al., 2006) Let I be an instance of ha. A rank-maximal
matching M in I can be constructed in O(min(n1 + r
∗, r∗
√
n1)m) time, where n1
is the number of applicants, m is the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs,
and r∗ is the maximum rank of an applicant’s house in M .
Theorem 14.24 (Huang and Kavitha, 2012) Let I be an instance of ha. A greedy
maximum matching M in I can be constructed in O(r∗
√
nm log n) time, where n is
the number of applicants and houses, m is the number of acceptable applicant–house
pairs, and r∗ is the maximum rank of an applicant’s house in M . The same time
complexity holds for computing a generous maximum matching.
The algorithms referred to in Theorems 14.23 and 14.24 are also applicable in
the more general case that preference list contain ties.
14.4 Concluding remarks and further reading
In this chapter we have tried to cover some of the most important results on match-
ing problems with preferences. However the literature in this area is vast, and due to
space limitations, we could only cover a subset of the main results in a single survey
chapter. Chapter 11 (Thomson, 2015) introduces some of our matching problems
within the context of fair resource allocation, namely, object allocation problems
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(ha), priority-augmented object allocation problems (sc), and matching agents to
each other (smi and hr). The following non-exhaustive list of articles contains nor-
mative results for these problems and basic axioms of fair allocation as introduced in
Chapter 11 (Thomson, 2015) (e.g., resource-monotonicity, population-monotonicity,
consistency, converse consistency): Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2007, 2011); Ehlers et al.
(2002); Ergin (2000); Kesten (2009); Sasaki and Toda (1992); Toda (2006).
One obvious omission has been the Stable Roommates problem (sr), a non-
bipartite generalisation of sm. However a wider class of matching problems, known
as hedonic games, which include sr as a special case, are explored in Chapter 15
(Aziz and Savani, 2015).
Looking ahead, it seems likely that the level of interest in matching under pref-
erences will show no sign of diminishing, and if anything we predict that this field
will continue to grow. This is due in no small part to the exposure that the research
area has had on a global stage following the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley in 2012. Another contributing factor
is the increasing engagement by more and more elements of society in forms of
electronic communication, thereby easing preference elicitation and centralisation
of allocation processes.
To conclude, we give some sources for further reading. For more details on struc-
tural and algorithmic aspects of sm, hr and sr, we recommend Gusfield and Irving
(1989). The second author’s monograph (Manlove, 2013) provides an update to
Gusfield and Irving (1989) and also expands the coverage to include ha. It expands
on the algorithmic results presented in this chapter in particular. For more depth
from an economic and game-theoretic viewpoint, the reader is referred to Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), which considers issues of strategy in sm and hr in much more
detail, and also covers monetary transfer and the Assignment Game. Finally, more
recent results that also include economic applications (e.g., school choice and kidney
exchange) are reviewed by So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) and Vulkan et al. (2013).
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